Furthermore, would it be moral and responsible to act morally because one has the sense (the word emphasized above) of duty and responsibility? […] All this, therefore, still remains open, suspended, undecided, questionable even beyond the question, indeed, to make use of another figure, absolutely aporetic. What is the ethicity of ethics? The morality of morality? What is responsibility? What is the “What is?” in this case? […]
So the nonrespone. Clearly, it will always be possible to say, and it will be true, that nonresponse is a response. One always has, one always must have, the right not to respond, and this liberty belongs to responsibility itself, that is, to the liberty that one believes must be associated with it. One must always be free not to repsond to an appeal or to an invitation – and it is worth remembering this, reminding oneself of the essence of this liberty. Those who thing that responsibility or the sense of responsibility is a good thing, a prime virture, indeed the Good itself, are convinced, however, that one must always answer (for oneself, to the other, before the other, or before the law) and that, moreover, a nonrepsonse is always a modality determined in the space opened by an unavoidable responsibility. Is there nothing more to say about nonresponse? On it or on the subject of it, if not in its favor?
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